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Abstract
The Soviet Union of the 1930s was marked by fearmongering, denunciations, and a series
of show trials that rocked the Communist Party. The Great Terror started officially in late 1934
and continued until 1938, entangling millions within its web of imprisonment, forced labor, and
executions. The general consensus has been that the Terror was a result of government influence
and citizens’ actions. A lot of the research done on this era has focused on why the average
citizen would willingly participate in the government’s reign of terror. By examining a series of
memoirs written during and about this time and official speeches and publications from highranking Party members, this paper will show that the promised utopia was not enough to prevent
discontent and the Soviet government turned to terror to consolidate its power further. In an
attempt to fight the alleged class enemies within the Soviet society or to prevent themselves from
being implicated, citizens wrote denunciations against family members, neighbors, bosses, etc.
Doing so spread the purge into factories and small towns. By looking into the role of
denunciations, in the Terror, this paper sheds light on the mechanisms of other campaigns of
fear.
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On December 1, 1934, Sergei Mironovich Kirov, the head of the Leningrad Communist
Party, died under suspicious circumstances. 1 Following the death of Kirov within the Smolny
Institute, which served as the local party headquarters, Josef Stalin announced this death to the
public and declared Kirov’s assassination the work of double-dealers, or traitor. Stalin’s
publication in the Soviet magazine Pravda spoke positively of Kirov’s work, belying the
tensions within the Communist Party, and described the terrible fate that had befallen Kirov. “A
man who has given all his brilliant life to the cause of the working class, to the cause of
Communism, to the cause of the liberation of humanity, is dead, victim of the enemy.” 2 In using
such strong language against the supposed perpetrators, Stalin emphasized the problem of
enemies within the Soviet Union and fostered fear within the people.
While the circumstances of this assassination are still up for debate, its influence on the
Purges that followed has never been questioned. This incident was used as justification for what
has been called the Great Terror. Stalin and other party officials exploited this fear of enemies
and violence and set about on an operation to purify the Soviet Union of its perceived
imperfections and antagonists. In the aftermath, anyone considered a political enemy, as vague as
that term was, was targeted by the NKVD, the Soviet secret police. The number of those affected
by the Terror are difficult to pin down, disputed in almost every facet. “The estimates range from
a few million to well over 20 million victims. There is relative consensus that in the years 19301956, between 17 and 18 million were sentenced to detention in prisons, colonies, and camps.”3

Wendy Z. Goldman, Inventing the Enemy: Denunciation and Terror in Stalin’s Russia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), 1-2.
2
J.V. Stalin., "The Death of Kirov," Marxist Internet Archive, 2008, accessed February 2, 2019,
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1934/12/01.htm.
3
Nanci Adler, “Enduring Repression: Narratives of Loyalty to the Party Before, During and After the Gulag,”
Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 2 (March 2010): 215.
1
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Until 1938, officials, party members, industrial leaders, average workers, peasants, etc. were
labelled spies and saboteurs in the ensuing chaos.
The Great Terror of the 1930s rocked the Soviet Union into mass hysteria. This period
was marked by arrests, forced labor, torturous interrogations, and executions. Fueled by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the show trials that popped up around the
nation, the ordinary citizen was swept up into a campaign bigger than themselves but defined by
their involvement. The Party, and the government that implemented its ideology, were
responsible for creating the environment where denunciations, or communication between
citizens and a higher authority that contains accusations against other citizens with the intent of
punishment, thrived. Through enforcing the Party line and fostering mass hysteria through
propaganda and inflammatory speeches and official publications, the government was able to
indoctrinate the citizenry into the Party and subdue the rising tensions within society. This
process of total indoctrination only became more rampant, a result of the Party realizing that
their promised utopia did not match with the current state of the Soviet Union, creating a society
based on fear and control and prompting denunciations and the Terror.
The real beginning of the Great Terror started before the 1930s with precedents set during
the collectivization campaigns, dekulakization campaigns against prosperous peasants, the
Bolshevik consolidation of power, and national campaigns against foreigners, all done by Stalin
to amass power and enforce his will. Industrialization and modernization were starting to be
achieved, though only on a limited scale, and many citizens became disillusioned with the
communist system. Stalin, aware of the tensions mounting in cities and in the countryside,
implemented terror to reign in the people and further indoctrination into the Communist Party. In
the ensuing chaos, many started to exploit and project their impurities onto those around them,
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perpetuating the categorization of people with new accusations and broadening the pool of
victims. This indoctrination into Party ideology and crushing of any opposition created an
important moment in Soviet history.
While there has been much debate on the source of the Great Terror, a general consensus
has been reached: a mix of policy and influence from the party, the government it controlled, and
compliance from the citizens. The government was culpable for its contribution in shaping the
political climate, for following and enforcing party doctrine. By creating a sense of denounce or
be denounced, the Party started a wave of fear and a process of guilt by association that
encompassed everyone within the Soviet Union. When everyone was a target, including highranking members of the Party itself, drastic measures were taken and normalized. This
culpability, however, did not absolve citizens of their involvement. The average citizen was
responsible for their actions during the Purges. This was not limited to writing denunciations, but
also the passive acceptance of the Terror and the promotion of Soviet ideals. Families and
friendships were torn apart with the up and down motion of denunciation, the sending up of
letters to higher authorities and the heavy-handed response sent down in return, and without
resistance, the ripple effect was able to widen indefinitely. 4 Why did the Great Terror happen?
When does the responsibility for its spread switch from the Party to the average citizen? Who
sustained it and what factors in society allowed it to flourish?
My paper draws on English translations of memoirs by those affected and involved,
including Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Nadezhda Mandelstam, Victor Andreevich Kravchenko,
Anna Larina, and Evgenia Ginzburg. It also uses speeches delivered by Soviet leaders and other
official material, i.e. propaganda and the Penal Code of the R.S.F.S.R, specifically Article 58.

4

Goldman, Inventing, 299.
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Besides these primary sources, secondary sources provide an interesting discussion of the
historical precedents of denunciation and the willingness of the people to follow Party doctrine. I
have been able to use the authors’ archival research and their analysis of primary documents to
shape my overall picture of the era. Important authors include: Sheila Fitzpatrick, who writes on
the history of denunciation around the world with a focus on Russia; Zbigniew Brzezinski, a
Polish-American diplomat and political scientist who writes about terror within totalitarian
regimes; and Jochen Hellbeck and Igal Halfin, who both focus on the issues of individuality and
diaries during Stalinism. They all focus on different aspects of Soviet life in this time and have
been invaluable in my investigation into this topic.
Within the memoirs, I was looking for reflections on the Terror. How did the author cope
emotionally with the Terror, and how did their mindset change over the period? What did they
believe, during or after the Terror, led citizens to denounce others? Because it is nearly
impossible to figure out an individual’s motives for writing their denunciation letter, I had to
look for broader themes within the memoirs, including desperation, despair, grief, betrayal, etc. I
then placed their experiences into the broader history of the time period shown in the speeches
and official publications issued by the government and party. My secondary sources provided
context and raw data for what the authors were experiencing and show the backdrop of citizen’s
actions and beliefs.
My paper will be split into five main sections dealing with Party’s beliefs, the state’s
influence, and the citizens’ responses. The first section will cover the background of the Party
and the Soviet Union. The second will deal with the ideology of the Soviet self, detailing purity,
diaries and autobiographies, literary campaigns, loyalty to the Party, replacement of religion, and
national campaigns as precedents. This is important to show the pressures from the government
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on the general populace and explain why people gave into these pressures. The third section will
deal with letter-writing culture overall, which will show the tradition of communication between
the people and the government, including denunciations. The fourth section is about the fearmongering during the Purge, detailing indoctrination, enemies, the end of personal relationships,
and the Gulag. Most of these aspects, excluding mass hysteria and the loss of self, have histories
in the Tsarist era. 5 While these topics seem disconnected from the Purge, all contributed to the
environment where denunciations thrived and help to explain why some heeded this call. By
analyzing memoirs and other primary sources, I hope to show the options people had during this
era, their feelings, why they believed or continue to believe in the Party during and after the
Terror, and the dissonance many developed from this epoch. The last section will deal with the
aftermath of the Terror, the continued fear of persecution, and the petition process for
rehabilitation and reinstatement into the CPSU.
Background
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a pervasive and powerful force that
controlled the government and influenced the people in every almost aspect of their lives. Before
Stalin, however, the Party used different methods to gain and keep power. By using World War I
and the following Civil War to foster discontent and create extremists, the Party was successful
in gaining, maintaining, and exerting its power. They also were able to point to Russia’s
backwardness as a problem of imperialism and revamp society based around modernization and
industrialization.6 When the Civil War ended and the Party was finally sure of its survival,

5
6

Solzhenitsyn, 132, 298, 319.
J. V. Stalin, "A Year of Great Change: On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution,"
Marxist Internet Archive, 2008, accessed May 9, 2019, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/
1929/11/03.htm.
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officials were able to change their tactics. During the Terror, the Party was able to consolidate
control through fear and exploitation of crises and prejudices. With this, and by banning all other
political parties, the Communist Party became the only power within the Soviet Union for over
half a century.
The government imposed by the CPSU can be described as totalitarian. Through
eliminating all other ideologies and dissenting opinions, the Communists believed they were able
to set themselves up as the future of mankind. From the Cold War perspective of Zbigniew
Brzezinski, the Communists wanted to undo everything from the Tsarist era, including basic
aspects of society: “Their ideology,” Brzezinski wrote, “provides a total critique of the
antecedent form of societal organization and a prescription for a complete reconstruction of
society and man.”7 The Party believed they could take any action necessary to consolidate and
keep power, including through the use of terror. Members of society, within and outside the
Party, were swept up into the ideology and its required actions. Stalin was not the first general
secretary to undertake this process. Lenin also used terror and coercion to transform the
revolutionary movement into a disciplined government, though not to the extent that Stalin did
after Lenin’s death in 1924. 8
The Russia at the beginning of the early communist movement, the late early 1900s until
1922, was plagued by widespread discontent from World War I, food and goods shortages, and
the delayed then rapid industrialization, showcased when compared to their neighbors and
subsequent enemies throughout Europe. Vladimir Lenin was able to take these problems and
formulate them into a revolutionary movement centered around modernization. With this, he was

7
8

Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Nature of the Soviet System." Slavic Review 20, no. 3 (October 1961): 353.
Ibid., 354.
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able to overthrow the government and gain followers throughout the empire. During the Civil
War, those with connections to the past regime were purged or converted to Marxism, forcibly. 9
After the Civil War, the Party set out to remove all other aspects of society, including religion
and anything related to the Tsarist era. 10 Through modernization and the spread of communist
ideology, the Party was able to recreate the Russian Empire into the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and establish itself as the first communist country in 1922.
The late 1920s into the early 1930s was the time of the Five Year Plans introducing
collectivization, dekulakization, and industrialization. In 1928, the First Five Year Plan was
issued, calling for rapid industrialization on a scale never seen before. 11 The Soviet Union was
successful, but at the cost of millions of lives. The Second Five Year Plan was issued in 1933,
calling for collectivization and dekulakization aimed at removing private property in the
countryside and ridding the nation of petite bourgeoisie, the prosperous peasants who were cast
as exploiters. Many were forced from the countryside into cities as displaced citizens or forced to
work on communes, named kolkhozes.12 Industrialization was fueled by urbanization, continuing
modernization, and became a focal point in propaganda. “The organizational compulsion of the
party for ideology-action thus becomes the source and the means of modernization, thereby
strengthening the party’s social legitimization.” 13 This removal of the private economy and quest
for modernization created a vacuum the Party could fill, instilling zeal in its members and
converting bystanders into loyal communists.

9

Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5.
Brzezinski, 352.
11
Lewis Siegelbaum, "Year of Great Change," Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, 2002, accessed May 9, 2019,
http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1929-2/year-of-great-change/.
12
Wendy Z. Goldman, "Twin Pyramids–Perpetrators and Victims." Slavic Review 72, no. 01 (Spring 2013): 26.
13
Brzezinski, 360.
10
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However, the 1920s and 1930s were not only filled with problems for the average citizen,
whether in the city or the countryside. After Lenin’s death in early 1924, the Party faced
leadership conflicts. Originally Stalin fought against Leon Trotsky to become the next general
secretary until his victory that same year, clinched by Trotsky’s flight from the country in 1936.
After Stalin officially came to power, he still dealt with the issue of opposition. 14 In the
following years, he would purge, remove from the Communist Party, anyone he believed would
oppose him, including Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and Nikolai Bukharin. All three, and
many others purged, were leading members of the Communist Party and part of the Bolsheviks
long before the USSR was established. They all met their deaths in the show trials that marked
the Terror and became some of the most publicized victims of the era.
While so-called Trotskyites, believers of Trotsky’s theory of Marxism, and enemies were
being publicly tried for their crimes in Moscow, people around the nation were called to
denounce enemies and double-dealers. Members of the party were especially sensitive to this but
the average citizen was also recruited into this endeavor. The Party was able to maintain
conformity through indoctrination and to maintain order through terror. 15 Terror, combined with
improvements in industry and modernization caused many to join into the Party ranks and others
to tacitly support the Party. These circumstances provide the background for what became the
Terror and the history of the Soviet Union through the 1930s. People were conditioned to accept
the Party and its ideology from the onset of the Bolshevik regime and this only continued
through Stalin’s regime.

14
15

Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7.
Nanci Adler, “Enduring Repression: Narratives of Loyalty to the Party Before, During and After the Gulag,”
Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 2 (March 2010): 211.
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The Party
Ideology and Ideological Action
Ideology served as a mode of control in the Soviet Union and the image it presented to
the citizens shows why some were willing to engage in denunciatory practices. The Stalinist
period was defined by the destruction of Tsarist and early Bolshevik frameworks and the
beginning of an outline for control that would span until 1953. 16 Stalin had to deal with
widespread discontent stemming from collectivization, the move from private farming to
communal farming, usually by force, and industrialization that arose during this era. 17 While
consciousness, awareness of one’s place in the world, i.e. proletariat or bourgeois, is seen as a
basic tenet of Communism, it proved difficult in keeping the masses subjugated. Nevertheless,
consciousness remained vital to the party line. As a result, a maxim of Lenin’s was put into
effect: “Bring order or implement terror.” 18 The Communist Party marked their ideology as one
of action and struggle, and how one dealt with this struggle was the key to gaining the
revolutionary consciousness necessary to further the Soviet Union to its utopian end.19
To implement their ideal world, the Soviets developed the idea of the New Man. The
ideal of the New Soviet Man was pervasive and changed according to current party goals. The
party, under the strict hand of Stalin, promoted this new man and an era of transparency. The
new man was to epitomize the revolutionary spirit of the Bolsheviks and help to bring an
international communist state into being. 20 They were to transform themselves into this ideal

16

Brzezinski, 354.
Ibid., 352.
18
Nanci , 214.
19
Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2006), 26-32.
20
Ibid., 29.
17
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while maintaining complete openness and loyalty to the state. 21 They were to be completely and
wholly dedicated to the Soviet system and its future. A level of ideological purity was required,
forcing many to overcome and disassociate with their family’s history if they wanted to become
a party member.22 This proved difficult after twenty years marked by revolutions in 1917, a civil
war from 1917 to 1922, and a short stint under the New Economic Policy in 1921, where
capitalism was briefly reestablished. Everyone was tainted in some way by the association to the
past and this made the culture of denunciations viable. When everyone has something that makes
them an enemy in the eyes of the Party, denunciations become easier to write and harder to
dodge.
Another important aspect for membership within the Party was the writing and constant
editing of an autobiography, which serves as a vital source for understanding the Stalinist period
from a citizen’s perspective. While overall there was a push for the removal of the individual
self, which would cause tensions discussed later, the autobiography served to establish a person
in their journey to self-realization under the Communist system. These autobiographies served as
a vital part within Soviet culture, being a part of the interviewing process for university or
employment opportunities and demanded at almost every stage in life. During the Purge, these
autobiographies were frequently reviewed by their authors and those around them, and any fault
could mean expulsion from the Party. “The Communist’s subjective essence, the strength or
weakness of his character, came to the fore in his ‘autobiography,’ which he recited to his party
comrades in the climatic dramatic moment of the purge process.” 23 These autobiographies
showed a person’s struggles, successes, and, even, their contribution to the Revolutions of 1917,

21

Ibid., 6.
Goldman, Inventing, 16-17.
23
Hellbeck, Revolution, 26.
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no matter how small. By forcing many to write themselves into history, many joined the CPSU
in their missions implicitly, even without official party membership.
The Communist Party portrayed themselves as, “the bearer of light whose mission was to
bring education and technology to Russia’s ‘dark’ masses.”24 Under this guise, loyalty to the
Party was noble, and many party members wanted to be part of the wonderful future that was
promised to them. However, loyalty had a cost. When the state officially warned its people about
internal enemies, many sprang to the defense of the nation. 25 It was one’s patriotic duty to report
suspicious activity, no matter the relationship between the denouncer and denounced. As
tensions escalated, people started to show their loyalty by publicly interrogating others,
especially during Party meetings in factories.26 Without this public display, one’s loyalty could
be considered questionable and, in the era of denunciations, a fate marked by torturous
interrogations, and forced labor was a reality for millions of Soviets. This loyalty can also be
used to explain the multitude of rehabilitation letters filed after the death of Stalin in 1953 by
those denounced and stripped of their party membership. 27
In the Stalinist era starting in 1928, legal specialists determined that a suitable socialist
society had been achieved. 28 This was determined by the successes in Soviet Russia’s
industrialization campaigns up to this point and the fight against capitalism seen in the cities and
countryside.29 As a result, people were no longer able to excuse anti-communist thoughts or
actions on Russia’s past capitalistic history and the New Economic Policy was replaced with a
planned economy. Suddenly, the average citizen was fully culpable compared to the leniency of

24

Hellbeck, Revolution, 21.
Goldman, Inventing, 300-301.
26
Ibid., 21.
27
Adler, 212-216.
28
Hellbeck, Revolution, 34.
29
J. V. Stalin, "A Year of Great Change.”
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the 1920s. The Soviet Union was attempting to create, “a social body defined in terms of
absolute purity of spirit.”30 In this drive to eliminate any individual or group that did not conform
to the Soviet system, the government encouraged denunciations and people accepted this call. 31
Simultaneously, many realized that any ideologically impure thought or history could be
exploited, only exacerbating the fear and confusion. 32 Everyone was vulnerable and this
realization further divided the people within the country, creating a perfect storm for what
became known as the Great Terror.
Autobiographies and Diaries
“And here we are! The Kirov wave from Leningrad has begun…an ‘accelerated’ judicial
procedure was introduced… And there was no right of appeal. It is also believed that one quarter
of Leningrad was purged – cleaned out – in 1934-1935.”33 This was said by Alexander
Solzhenitsyn, a victim of the Gulag system who spent eight years in a forced labor camp then his
life in exile. He was an outspoken critic of the Soviet Union. His memoir, The Gulag
Archipelago, has become the foremost piece of literature on the Terror and the Soviet penal
system. His memoir and various other writings he kept throughout his imprisonment, and used
against him, are examples of the larger tradition of diary keeping, which, as mentioned earlier,
was utilized by the Party as a proof of loyalty. 34
For some, a diary was not worth the risk. “When a person was arrested—and that could
happen to anyone at any time in Stalin’s Russia—the first thing to be taken was his or her diary,
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Ibid., 35.
Goldman, Inventing, 5.
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Ibid., 16-17.
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Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation,
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which would be scrutinized by the police for evidence of ‘anti-Soviet’ thoughts.”35 For others,
however, a diary allowed the ability to analyze their situation and work through problems they
had with Communism without fully abandoning the Party, hopefully without the Party’s
knowledge.36 For those who had dedicated many years of their lives to the Party and were now
faced with fears of denunciation or the denunciation of someone close, a diary proves crucial.
The Party, for some, was the most important thing in their lives, and in a society where any
fleeting thought can be criminalized, a diary provided an outlet. However, diaries, as noted
above, held multiple risks and many have not survived the Terror.
Both the diary and autobiography were possible due to campaigns from the CPSU and the
government to increase literacy and standardize education. This also allowed for a greater class
consciousness. In order to achieve the widespread political understanding a Communist society
required, elementary level reading and writing skills were necessary. While education would
remain an important facet of Soviet life, originally this was done to instill the revolutionary
consciousness that marked the ideal man. Interestingly, the method of teaching that would
characterize Soviet schools developed in this era emphasized individual thought and championed
intellect.37 This is often used as a justification for the actions of the Communist Party and the
Soviet government, becoming an example of good that arose during the early Soviet years, the
so-called “light” mentioned above. However, this does not excuse the Purge overall nor absolve
the government of their wrongdoings.
While not written for the sole purpose of being their official autobiographies, each of the
memoirs I have highlighted are examples of this culture. Former Party members, Evgenia
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Ginzburg, Victor Andreevich Kravchenko, and Anna Larina, provide the reader with the pressure
and sense of fear that permeated throughout the Party ranks. Evgenia Ginzburg was a stalwart
party member until she was implicated in participating in counter-revolutionary groups after
Kirov’s assassination. 38 She details her interrogations, her trial, imprisonment and exile in her
memoir, struggling to come to terms with what has happened to not only her but other party
members within the Soviet Union. Anna Larina was married to Nikolai Bukharin who was a
high-ranking party member and victim of the 1937 show trials in Moscow. 39 Because of her
association, she was exiled, arrested, and sent to a work camp for 20 years. During her time in
the Gulag, she learned of her husband’s assassination and was only released upon Stalin’s death
in 1953. Victor Andreevich Kravchenko was lucky in the sense that he was not denounced or
arrested before he defected in 1944. 40 He was a Ukrainian-born party member and engineer.
However, he became disillusioned with the Communist Party after witnessing the Ukrainian
famine and the Great Terror. He documents the fear that existed even within the educated circles
during the 1930s.
The Terror also affected non-Party members, especially in campaigns targeting writers
and the intelligentsia. Osip Mandelstam was a poet who was arrested in 1934. 41 His wife,
Nadezhda Mandelstam documents his four-year imprisonment and later death in a transit camp.
She discusses the degradation of society after the 1920s and establishes her husband as a martyr
of the system. Alexander Solzhenitsyn was a Soviet writer and outspoken critic of the Soviet
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government who was later punished for his critiques.42 In 1945, he was arrested and sentenced to
eight years in a forced labor camp. His story takes place after the Terror, but his book, a mixture
of memoir and interviews, has proven invaluable to understanding the Soviet penal system, the
NKVD and its methods, and the camps throughout Siberia. All five of these writers were victims
of this turbulent time period and, without their contribution to the memory of the Terror, many of
the millions of victims would have been forgotten along with the Stalin’s crimes.
Historical Precedents
Stalin and other officials did not create the Terror out of nothing. On the back of terror
campaigns dating back to the Russian Revolutions and carried throughout the Civil War, the
basis for the Purges were in place by 1934. Dekulakization began, wholeheartedly, in 1929. 43
The process of eliminating these ‘richer peasants’ was defined by deportation, arrests, and
executions, often on the basis of limited evidence from other peasants. More campaigns in 1932
against the criminal and marginal elements, especially in cities, also had extrajudicial
proceedings and mass arrests. Both of these campaigns established a structure that would be used
during the Purge and, specifically, the campaigns against national groups in 1937 and 1938. The
disenfranchised as they became known were stripped of all “political and economic rights.”44
Other targeted groups included traders, middlemen, priests and rabbis, the mentally ill, and
anyone connected to the past tsarist regimes. 45 The majority, however, were punished for
economic transgressions as communism was more widely enforced.
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These campaigns also served other functions. They reinforced the categorization of
disenfranchised groups and established a sense of fear. Many denounced others according to
these groupings, even if previously denounced themselves for being of the same class, bolstering
the government’s claim of the existence of political enemies. 46 “The disenfranchised helped to
perpetuate the policy that condemned them.” In addition to bolstering official policy, these
denunciations continued to divide society into ever-smaller groupings based on increasinglyspecific criteria. This would only bring about more denunciations in the end. On creating fear,
these campaigns were not revealed to the public. 47 The public was aware of enemies but not of
the mass round-ups and definitely not of the official operations behind them. As a result, citizens
believed those arrested during these national campaigns were arraigned as wreckers and spies,
only increasing fear and suspicion towards fellow citizens. If everyone arrested is an enemy, who
is safe? Who can be trusted, besides the government?
By utilizing similar methods that had been used in the past, the CPSU was able to exploit
past prejudices against prosperous peasants, landlords, managers, and minorities, to further their
terror campaigns. People joined the call to rid society of those different from the average
working class factory member or peasants, especially when they believed that they would be the
leading group within the promised utopia. It also enabled the CPSU to continue campaigns
against foreigners and other targets without drawing the ire from the citizenry. Many believed
the arrests were done for national security reasons and, as a result, did not fight against the taking
of neighbors or close friends. Some even joined in the campaign through denouncing these
supposed enemies.
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Loss of Religion
In this era, with the dissolution of the Russian Orthodox Church and other political
parties, the Communist Party became exalted as a religion to some. Faith to the Party, even if
excluding some leaders, was common in the aftermath of the Gulag experience. 48 Religion is
powerful, being noted by Marx as something to be avoided, and with the CPSU taking this
position, they were able to influence behavior through the concept of sin, specifically
punishment through expulsion and forced labor. 49 Through punishment and by offering group
membership and a perspective that could explain the problems of the world, the Communist
Party became the religion of the land, boosted by official government policy. 50 This faith is
noteworthy because for some it was not shaken by the Gulag experience. For some, they saw
themselves as the exception to the rule, the innocent among the guilty swept up in the Purge.
“The claim that one is an exception presupposes an acceptance of the rule and effectively
reassures the audience that the system in place is justified and does work.” 51
The Party also became the path to opportunity and education during the 1920s and 1930s,
causing many to join in its fight. The Communist Party provided opportunities to lower class
workers and peasant farmers. These opportunities included social mobility, job offerings, higher
wages, preferential housing, and other perks that seem almost like a form of salvation. The Party,
in seeking members from modest backgrounds, were able to exploit the widespread poverty that
existed in the Tsarist era and early Soviet period in recruitment. 52 The members were usually
more politically aware than the average citizen but, nevertheless, still connected to their roots, by

48

Adler, 214.
Ibid., 217-218.
50
Ibid., 219-220.
51
Alexopoulos, 639.
52
Goldman, Inventing, 9.
49

Griffin 22

association with non-member family, friends, and co-workers. The two largest groups within the
Soviet Union were workers and peasants, and the Party was smart for tapping into such a large
resource. They were able to mobilize their forces and, through party meetings, were able to
influence members’ behaviors. 53 Each meeting brought new rules which were then passed on
through members onto non-members until everyone followed the same tenets. Through this, the
behavior of the masses was controlled indirectly but effectively.
Through connections with non-members, the Communist Party was able to exert control
over every member of society. However, this was easier with party members who were expected
to base their entire lives around the ideals of the CPSU. “To the extent that the individual’s
subsistence becomes reliant on the Communist Party, it is psychologically and politically too
dangerous to criticize the Party. Supplication, felt or feigned, can be in the service of selfinterest.”54 With the Party controlling the monopoly of culture and social behaviors, even a nonbeliever was influenced by their directives and shifts in official ideology. This influence
combined with Stalin’s sudden ideological changes resulted in constant pressure to remain along
the correct party line, whatever that happened to be that day. For party members, this pressure
only increased ten-fold and party officials were always aware that a shift of ideology could be a
shift in favor, resulting in show trials, forced labor, or execution for themselves and their
families. While no one was safe from the threat of the Terror, conforming to Stalin’s vision of
communism provided some safety, if only temporarily.
Good standing within the Party was crucial for many aspects of life. This might explain
the vast number of rehabilitation letters received by the Soviet government following Stalin’s
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death. Upon release from the Gulag, even if proven innocent, reinstatement was not a
guarantee.55 Many letters express support for the very system that imprisoned them. Many were
forced to reconcile their thoughts and actions, and this cognitive dissonance, from personal
experience versus official Party account, was difficult for many. 56 But, in the end, reinstatement
into the Party was preferred for victims of the Gulag. However, this loyalty was not widespread
and many only wanted rehabilitation for the privileges being in good party standing brought: “If
an ex-prisoner could receive rehabilitated status, with Party rehabilitation, the chances of a
normal civil life, including material benefits, were much greater.” 57 Rehabilitation, while beyond
the scope of this paper, offers an important look into the mindset of those accused. Because those
who were accused often overlapped with those who accused others, its shows the power of the
Party within society, even after the return from the Gulag.
Letter-Writing Culture
Denunciations are only a small part of the overall letter-writing culture that was present
within the Soviet Union. Many within the Soviet Union wrote for a variety of reasons, ranging
from complaints, appeals for help, denunciations, and confessions. This letter-writing culture
was present since the days of the Tsar, explaining the widespread involvement from the citizens
and its cultural legacy. These letters also provided insight into how the people viewed the Soviet
Union and were used by the government as a way to gauge the public opinion. 58 As a result, the
government encouraged citizens to continue to write letters by responding to letters, either
through aid or through investigations into allegations. This back-and-forth relationship between
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the citizens and the government through letters was important during the Terror and provides
context for denunciations overall.
The letters written before and during the Terror were plentiful and commonplace and sent
to multiple official outlets or leaders within the Party. The letters sent to newspaper were rarely
published and letters to officials dealt with problems both public and private. Newspapers
processed citizens’ letters and passed them to the appropriate authorities, sometime even
investigating the claim themselves. 59 The reason for letters is based on tradition, where the
authority figure, in this case Stalin, becomes a “beloved father” who wants to help his citizens. 60
Letters directed to this father-figure, dubbed victim letters, were mostly calls for assistance,
usually surrounding the constant housing crises within the cities. In return, the government
sometimes would help the victims in these letters, prompting more letter writing. “The degree
and kind of response that could be expected from the authorities is obviously crucial to one’s
understanding of the phenomenon of popular letter-writing.”61
Another genre of letters deals with critiques towards Stalin and his Party. Many letters
were signed anonymous, a genre labeled anonimka, usually directing anger towards the
government policies and perceived injustices about privileged classes. 62 Some stressed their
individuality in the face of official policy and wanted freedom through their letters. 63 Other types
of critiques were less forward and usually based on explaining one’s conviction to an official.
These letters, classified as confession letters, were usually sincere confessions aimed at
explaining their actions. 64 These letters were primarily from women and show the importance of
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the party in the minds of the people. Like a priest during the sacrament of reconciliation, citizens
told the government of their faults in the hopes of receiving forgiveness for being forthcoming.
Denunciation letters were only a fraction of the letters received by Soviet officials. The
attitudes towards denunciations are heavily influenced by the culture in which it exists.65 The
public opinion on denunciations influenced how the citizens reacted to calls for denunciations,
and while publicly they might be reviled, in private there was something to gain from
denouncing others. Not all denunciations were entirely voluntary, with many being extracted
during NKVD interrogations, which routinely involved torture and threats. 66 There is also a
distinction between formal denunciations, those done by informants to the secret police, and
informal denunciations, the spontaneous revealing of law breaking, dissention, or political and
social faults.67 This paper focuses primarily on informal denunciations not extracted during
interrogations, showing why ordinary citizens suddenly denounce others without explicit
pressure.
While not being as severe as torture, the threat of punishment for many was enough to
illicit denunciations. Article 58 of the RSFSR Penal Code, originally published in 1927 and
amended six months before the death of Kirov in 1934, dealt with counterrevolutionary crimes,
which ranged from suspected sabotage to treason. This article is important for its specific call for
denunciations. Article 58-1 specifies that “Failure by a military member to denounce
preparations or the carrying-out of treason shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for 10
years.”68 For non-military citizens, the same crime “shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty
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for a term not less than six months,” according to Article 58-12.69 With the threat of punishment,
many were prompted to join the NKVD in the search for enemies and to denounce those around
them, at least in the hopes of protecting themselves.
Motives behind denunciation include patriotism and loyalty towards one’s country,
concern about enemies and criminals, fear of punishment, or personal interest. “Letters were
written to solve problems, resolve disputes and settle scores. People wrote in a spirit of duty,
malice, ambition, loneliness, despair.” 70 In these letters, a common theme was the presentation of
the denouncer being a loyalty communist and a victim and the denounced being an exploiter or
enemy. Many called upon specific stereotypes, like being a peasant, a widow, uneducated, 71 and
presented their enemy using their prejudices against managers and kulaks and other ethnic
groups.72 Many cited civic duty to the state in order to prevent accusations of personal interest,
though, “Frequently their motives were mixed, and personal interests could play a significant
role in citizens’ decisions to turn in friends, neighbors, and even relatives.”73 Denunciations
against close relatives, including the parents of those in youth groups, was considered a civic
duty to the nation, though denunciation was too common for individuals to receive praise. 74
For the secret police, denunciation letters proved invaluable. This was no different for the
government, who was clear in their calls for denunciations. The issue of denunciations thus
becomes one revolving around what it means to be a citizen. “Exploring the core of citizens’
commitment of loyalty to the state and their (perhaps incompatible) commitment of solidarity

69

Ibid.
Fitzpatrick, Supplicants, 81.
71
Ibid., 81.
72
Fitzpatrick and Gellately, 748, 763.
73
Ibid., 750.
74
Ibid., 756-757.
70

Griffin 27
with their fellow citizens.” 75 Denunciation becomes expected for any loyal citizen and one must
prove their loyalty through denunciation. This was not universal but the Terror could not have
happened on such a wide scale without citizen participation. Members of the Party felt obligated
to denounce other members for even minor offenses. 76
Denunciation became a staple within the Soviet legal system, where verdicts and
resolutions were not guaranteed. 77 Denunciations became essential to the governance of the
country during the 1930s, becoming primarily a bureaucratic problem and a moral problem
second. Thus the problem of morality surrounding denunciations became based on how close the
denounced and denouncer were. Denunciations against family and friends was considered
morally evil, but this was not common when bosses and managers were concerned. This line
shows that while public opinion on denunciations were predominately negative, there were also
situations where denunciations was seen as a good thing, complicating the matter of determining
why denunciations flourished.
Denunciation was also seen as a way to guarantee loyalty, especially from NKVD
officers, and became a primary method of control within the government. The government is,
“particularly likely to encourage their citizens or members to write denunciations against each
other for purposes of maintaining social control, ideological purity, virtue, and so on.”78 As a
result, denunciations were sometimes written preemptively to protect against being denounced.
With this, the government and secret police were able to extend their sphere of influence and
control over society. Without denunciations, the Terror, most likely, would have ended with the
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1936 and 1937 show trials, and affected only government officials and Party members, instead of
the millions that became entangled in its web.
Fear Mongering and Propaganda
The Terror is aptly named for its most visible symptom: widespread mass hysteria across
all levels of Soviet society. 79 The Soviet government was the hardest hit by mass hysteria while
also propagating its spread. Government and Party officials were directly responsible for creating
a sense of fear and insecurity within the population, aided by inconsistent ideology, widespread
cultural and social control, and propaganda calling for the liquidation of saboteurs and doubledealers. At the same time, Party officials were also affected by the fear of being denounced and a
shift of favor along with the ever-changing ideology. This puts the government into a precarious
situation that reinforces Stalin’s orders and authority. To avoid being purged, officials followed
Stalin’s arbitrary and, sometimes, contradictory ideas, and defined the lives of millions within
the Soviet borders. This fear eventually spread downwards and out, affecting the average citizens
under Communist control. “Thus there were spies upon the spies in an intricate pattern that
spread a tangible pull of fear.” 80
Indoctrination
Communism, especially under Stalin, had striking similarities and differences when
compared to other totalitarian regimes during the 20th century, such as Nazi Germany and
Communist China. According to C. W. Cassinelli’s, a political scientist writing during the height
of the Cold War, most totalitarian regimes do not have a concrete doctrine, resulting in
“contradictory and arbitrary ‘ideological’ practices.” 81 He proposes that, under Stalin’s rule, this
This phrase was popularized in the West with Robert Conquest’s book, The Great Terror.
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inconsistent rhetoric was intentional to foster insecurity within the masses and the Party ranks.
With members of the Party seeing Stalin as infallible under his cult of personality, similar to the
Roman Catholic Pope, Stalin becomes the leader of a quasi-religious ideology that is based on
his word alone.82 In his pursuits, he emphasized ideas he agreed with and concealed or outright
banned ideas that were dissatisfactory, contrary to his beliefs, or foreign. 83 While this had little
direct effect on the masses, it greatly affected the rank-and-file Communist Party of the Soviet
Union members. “The faithful party member never makes independent appraisals of the conduct
of the party, since he possesses no definite criteria as to the content of the ultimate society or
directions as to how to get there.” 84
Without a concrete doctrine, training of party members and their relatives was difficult to
achieve without the use of fear and the dissolution of personal relationships. “Moreover, it is
most significant that when the Communists train their real activists, they do not concern
themselves with ‘ideological’ matters. Obedience and ruthlessness based upon the complete
severing of all normal human intercourse is the goal.”85 The Communist Party indoctrinated its
rank-and-file members through fear and vague promises of utopia, doing away with a concrete
doctrine and consistent ideology. Anything that would bring about utopia was considered along
the party line. Without having a set doctrine, the Party was able to adjust its policies and ideals
without reason. They were able to extract loyalty by changing what was considered normal
social behavior, causing relationships to disintegrate and causing society to become fractioned
and insecure. Without a strong support system, the average person was especially sensitive to the
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changes of the Party, even if not a member, and more easily manipulated into following the
Party’s, i.e. Stalin’s, ideals.
Totalitarian states were successful in indoctrination because of their control of all aspects
of life. This social and psychological control meant that dissent was not only banned but almost
impossible to carry out. By breaking down support systems, people were isolated and more likely
to agree to and follow the Party, even if they knew they it was wrong. Everyone’s life, thoughts,
actions, and relationships are scrutinized and any moment of weakness or apprehension is
exploited. Anyone not willing to show their support was at risk of being arrested, interrogated,
and executed. This vulnerability affected not only party members but also the average citizens
within factories or working on communes.
Even without a set doctrine, the Party set out to control “all vital aspects of man’s
existence.”86 Everything done within the Soviet Union had to not only be along the Party line but
should also benefit the Party in its mission towards utopia. This ranged from everyday actions
and thoughts to the problem of hardships within this, supposedly, superior society. Hardships and
the maintenance of loyalty became the pillar of the ideal Soviet Man. Stalin in his early days
wanted to be a Marxist theorist and this is seen in his obsession with the ever-changing doctrine
of the Soviet Union and the new ideals set forth, such as socialism in one country, the Five Year
Plans, and the removal of old Tsarist and Bolshevik frameworks. To fit his new ideal, he
promoted Lenin while also changing the very structures Lenin established to create a global
powerhouse, isolated from the capitalistic world. He promoted whatever would solidify his
power and increase the control the Party has over society.
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The Party, in fostering a widespread sense of fear, offered security through conformity
and trust. While this did not affect everyone equally, this is an important shift for some and helps
explain the fanaticism and willingness to denounce or renounce personal relationships seen in
some individuals during Stalin’s rule. If everyone outside, and some within, the Soviet Union are
an enemy, then the only group you can trust becomes the government and the officials in charge,
who become the sole protector of the nation. However this protection was based on loyalty and
the meeting of expectations, causing many to change their personal behaviors to fit the new ideal
of the day. “Of course, it was one thing to order reforms, quite another to enforce them. Stalin
was right in his charge that the leaders feared the truth. They feared it because truth was an
almost always counter-revolutionary and always dangerous luxury.”87
For others, conformity was a feigned response to the pressures from the state. In public
they were just as communist as everyone else, but in private they were critical of the government
and longed for a different way of life. However, any critique of the government or show of
discontent was strictly prohibited under the rules of the Terror. The threat of execution or forced
labor, or in extreme cases, the interrogation and torturing of relatives, was enough to keep most
people in line. This was not only limited to those within the Party ranks but the average citizen as
well. When you do not know who is listening and what they might do, it is better to remain silent
and hope for better days.
However, loyalty was not always a guarantee of safety. For so-called kulaks, landlords,
and members targeted during the national campaigns, orthodoxy to the Party line was not enough
to overcome what the Soviet government saw as impurities and signs of being enemies. 88 Even
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the most devout communists were under the constant threat of liquidation. This precedence was
set during the early years of Stalin’s reign when national campaigns against foreigners were
rampant and dekulakization and collectivization was in full swing. 89 “It is not the dissenter but
the ‘political enemy’ to whom the terror is applied. When the kulaks have been eliminated, their
place is taken by national minorities, and the terror continues as before.” 90 This cycle endured
until the end of the Terror in 1938, but its effects and attitudes lasted well after World War II and
into the 1950s.
The Soviets managed to create a closed system where outside information was filtered
through them and their ideas were the only ones allowed. 91 In doing this, they created a system
where conformity was not only expected but seen as the only option. With this, some members
of Soviet society adopted the Communist Party’s ideals as strongly as their own. This was only
exacerbated by time spent in the Gulag, as some blamed themselves for the Party’s misguided
actions and believed the allegation against them were true, or at least, partially their doing.
Without outside ideas or a real view of the Western world, people were at the mercy of the
Communist Party and the image they put forth. It is easier for a government to indoctrinate their
people if citizens are only allowed to know what the government wants them to know. They are
able to continue the narrative that the Western world wants to destroy the Soviet Union and its
people, only continuing the fear that permeated society and convincing many to join in the fight
against these external, and internal, enemies.
The 1930s was also the time of the Great Depression for the West, something the Soviet
Union pointed to as a symptom of the problems with capitalism and the beginning of the end for
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the capitalist world. 92 By using this low point, Stalin was able to drive home the differences
between the Soviet Union and the West and show the strength of the Communist system,
according to the Party. This only served to create “greater antagonism” between capitalism and
communism, especially within industrial communities. As opposed to the unemployment and
stresses of the Great Depression, the Soviet Union could boast having low unemployment with
basic amenities provided, even if these promises were not true, or equal, in practice. Through the
promises of establishing a communist utopia, the CPSU was able to convince workers that
everything they did was for the betterment of the future and any hardships were noble in this
endeavor. This, compared to the plights of the capitalistic world of the 1930s, was preferred by
many within the borders of the Soviet Union. “In brief, Communism is the realization of all
man’s most noble ideals.”93
Other remarks on the Western world at the time focused solely on their constant
threatening of the Soviet Union and their goals. Marxist belief, while saying nothing on how a
government should rule, does specify that in the class-less utopia, there is no need for
government. Stalin’s justification for the continuation of his totalitarian regime was that “the
state could not wither away as long as capitalist states ‘encircled’ the Soviet Union.” 94 With the
use of threatening language, Stalin was not only able to justify his regime but also exacerbate the
fear within the general populace concerning the outside world. He also promised that after the
‘encirclement’ ended, all of the hardships plaguing society would disappear. 95 With the promise
to an end to the Terror, and denunciation, and poor living conditions, and forced loss of property
and other restrictive measures, the people were more likely to act upon these calls and do the
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bidding for the Party. This only added to the noble call of communism and the willingness to
participate under the CPSU.
While totalitarian regimes controlled every part of a person’s life, the average citizen is
not absolved of their crimes. Through nonaction, totalitarian regimes are able to thrive and
remain in power. Totalitarian regimes could only continue if “the masses of the population
remained politically neutral and passive.”96 This quote was said by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a
Polish-American diplomat and the National Security Advisor under President Carter. He had
done countless research on the Soviet system. However, this idea is challenged by the changes
that affected Soviet society during this time, including industrialization, increased literacy, and
the Stalinist ideals of nationalism and superiority. To maintain influence as the only ideology, the
Soviets controlled art, science, and history taught within the standardized education system and
in higher education.97 This included the “proletarianization” of art, where art was determined by
its usefulness in propagating the official agenda, not its content. 98
History was focused on the superiority of the Soviet state and science only focused on
Soviet discoveries, doing away with any foreign concepts, including DNA and fields of
linguistics.99 Stalin’s personal interest in the historical importance of Russia, including the
Byzantine tradition and the concept of Holy Russia influenced the official history of the Soviet
Union. With this, Stalin was able to control how the masses thought about art, history, and
science, while also promoting the dominance of the Soviet Union and its Russian foundation.
Again, with the control of all information, the CPSU was able to make the general populace
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dependent on its ideals and perspective and make them sensitive to the requests of the
government, including the writing of denunciations.
Another form of propaganda was created to convince the Soviet subjects of their exalted
position within this budding Communist utopia. “The Soviet system is said to provide a life full
of joy and plenty, with no unemployment and with the world’s lowest rent and most advanced
social insurance, all thanks to Comrade Stalin himself.”100 By promising a class-less society with
opportunities from standardized education, industrialization, increased food production, and the
increased standard of living for some with modernization, the Soviet Union was able to exploit
the positives of the party to influence the people. Some clung to these improvements as evidence
that the Party was successful in its endeavors and that their sacrifice meant something, that their
suffering was not in vain.
Stalin, while Georgian, was very pro-Russian and stressed the importance of Russia to
world history. “The role of Russia and the Russian has been stressed because, by stating that all
important past events had occurred within the area currently controlled by Stalin.”101 By calling
upon the past, Stalin is able to justify the legitimacy of the Soviet Union and showing the Soviet
Union as the next stage of global development. This sets up his regime as the future and sets up
basic education as a form of conversion or indoctrination. The Soviet Union and communist
ideology just become the next stage in Russian domination and the utopia becomes a promise,
given Russia’s past importance within religion and history. “To the totalitarian, ideas are
weapons; by constructing an iron curtain he insures the monopoly of his own.” 102
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Without a concrete doctrine, the Party was subject to changes in official ideals under
Stalin without provocation or explanation. “The famous purges of Soviet activists are often based
upon ‘opposition to the correct party line;’ the very arbitrariness of the line makes the purges
more devastating.”103 With a constantly shifting ideology along the lines of one man’s personal
ambitions, many were caught having acted against party ideals without having actively opposing
the Party. With this, fear and uncertainty plagued the minds of those living under this regime.
Without any other information except what was given by party, people were hopeless to fight the
influence of ideology and the indoctrination of the masses. Party members and average citizens,
alike, were under the control of one man, Josef Stalin, whose ideals and plans changed without
warning nor reason.
Enemies and Double-Dealers
Terror-era denunciations came from many sources. However one of the most important
were denunciations sent to government officials and the NKVD exposing enemies of the
Communist state, including class enemies, capitalist exploiters, and saboteurs.104 Many citizens
reacted to the official Soviet announcements with fear and insecurity and acted upon the
government’s call. As a result, those who were denounced were deprived of their rights, a
common aftermath of denunciation, and sent away for hard labor or just executed without
prejudice. The government, knowing the perpetuation of a group of enemies would only prompt
more denunciations, started a campaign of propaganda to continue its control. This propaganda,
aimed at indoctrination and the creation of fear, was successful in the latter but questionable in
the former.105
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In a speech given at the Plenum of the Central Committee on March 3, 1937, Stalin called
out Party members for carelessness when dealing with the issue of enemies and double-dealers.
He recalled the death of Kirov: “first serious warning which indicated that enemies of the people
would resort to double-dealing and that they would mask themselves as Bolsheviks, as Party
members, in order to worm their way into our confidence and to thus open access for themselves
into our organizations.”106 He claims that Party officials and members were impressed by the
economic successes of the Soviet Union, and thus, disregarded the war the Bolsheviks were still
under from internal and external sources. With the Soviet Union only encompassing one-sixth of
the world, the nation was sensitive to problems with the capitalist encirclement, “Is it not clear
that for as long as we have capitalist encirclement, we shall have wreckers, spies, diversionists,
and killers sent to our rear by agents of foreign states?” He also details how the Trotskyites from
the 1930s are not the same as the ones from the 1920s, usually more subverted and concealing
their platforms for fear of reprisal. Without acknowledging this difference, the Communist Party
was not able to fight these enemies successfully, leading to spies.
This speech, while detailing the, alleged, issues of the Soviet Union with enemies,
provides good background on Stalin’s thoughts during this time. By making such a speech at an
important conference for the party, Stalin not only called upon fellow members and officials to
act, but also was able to intensify the fear that many felt. One mistake, one association, was the
only thing between an official and exile, forced labor, or even death. This fear only spiraled
downward and Stalin’s continued references to these enemies convinced many that they were
real and everywhere within the Soviet Union. Many believed that any dissenting opinion or
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action was evidence of that person’s association with enemies, leading some to become paranoid
and believe that subversive and destructive behavior was imminent.
End of Personal Relationships
This propaganda also ruined the personal relationships maintained throughout the Soviet
Union. With the ever-growing reliance on terror, people were forced to adapt by changing their
views on their fellow countrymen, no matter their previous relationships. “The growing dread of
personal vulnerability produced a pervasive mistrust of others. People developed twisted, often
aggressive strategies for self-protection. The poisonous atmosphere seeped into even the closest
and most private of human relationships.” 107 Again, the destruction of a personal support base
makes the populace more vulnerable to the influence of the Party. With this, denunciation against
even a close family member in the hopes of protection become a means to an end. Stalin, in his
mission to establish complete control, used this uncertainty and the rising social tensions to his
benefit, only spreading the effects of the Terror further into the minds and lives of the average
citizen.108
The issue of emotions and relationships was a difficult and sensitive subject during the
Terror. With many desperate to protect themselves from the fate of those around them, they
denounced or were compliant in the arrests, destroying the very same bonds they relied on. In her
memoir Hope Against Hope chronicling her experiences after her husband was arrested for antiStalinist poetry and sentenced to internal exile, Nadezhda Mandelstam laments the effects of
denunciation and associations, even before being arrested. “It was always painful when
somebody one had become friendly with mysteriously broke off relations, but this, alas, was the
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only thing that honorable people could do if they refused to play the role of an ‘adjutant.’” 109 She
is very aware of what could happen if one associates with someone who is later implicated
during the Terror. She spends many nights awake, afraid for her colleagues and friends. She
wonders if they have been arrested and if so, what tortures await them at the hands of the
interrogators.110 While her story is not the typical case within the Soviet Union, being educated
and associating with other literary elites, her writings provide insight into the effects of fear on
personal relationships and how few options were provided. Mandelstam lost her husband while
in transit to a Gulag labor camp, escaping the fate of many during this era but only through
death.
Kravchenko mirrors these concerns in his memoir, I Chose Freedom. He laments about
the effects the Terror had on his relationships, especially as the Terror grew: “From this time
forward it became a matter of ‘honor’ to denounce and expose ‘disguised enemies’ in the Party.
You hesitated to talk to your closest comrades. You disassociated yourself from friends and
relatives and colleagues. What if they were infected, germ-bearers of the political epidemic
sweeping the land?”111 He acknowledges the issue of association and the solution. He talks about
how brotherhood is not enough to overcome the pressures from above, nor the response from
below. How pressures built until the basic bonds within the factory, the neighborhood, the family
were destroyed by the eminent explosion, marked by denunciations and arrests.
The Gulag System
The Gulag and its effects cannot be ignored when talking about the Terror. The Gulag is
responsible for furthering indoctrination even long after the end of the Terror and has become
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linked with the Terror, especially after Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s book was published in 1974.
Nanci Adler makes a case for the adoption of Soviet ideals by the general populace as a
symptom of the Terror, especially for those who served sentences. She states that they develop a
form of Stockholm Syndrome to deal with the pressures and fatigues of forced labor. 112 “Fear is
accompanied by the elevation of stress hormones, motivating people who are in a stressful
situation to forge rapid, strong, and sometimes permanent, attachment bonds to relieve the
neurobiological stress.”113 Because they have adopted the ideals of their oppressors, they blame
themselves for their plights and seek reconciliation from the Party about their perceived
transgressions. Because of this, the stress of the forced labor camps stays with the victims long
after their release in 1953 and the end of the Terror. 114 This continues throughout their lives and
for many within the Soviet Union, the threat of the being under the Gulag system keeps them
within Party line long after Stalin’s death.
Solzhenitsyn wrote about the pervasive fear within the prisons. “The convicted prisoner
had to learn that his worst guilt out in freedom had been his attempt somehow to get together or
unite with others by any route…In prison this fear went so far as to become fear of all kinds of
collective action: two voices uttering the same complaint or two prisoners signing a complaint on
one piece of paper.”115 Prisoners were unable to rely on each other for fear of retaliation, for fear
of punishment, for fear of conditions only worsening within the camps. The collective that was
so expounded upon by the Communist Party was broken within the camps, rendering the Gulag
its own little world within the Soviet Union, untouched by the ideals of the rest of the nation.
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The Gulag served as a pervasive threat within the Soviet system, and many who knew of
its existence were hellbent on remaining on the right side of Soviet opinion in order to avoid
being imprisoned, no matter the costs. Forced labor was seen as a form of reconciliation, of
repentance for past crimes. But if one is able to act in accordance with the Party, including in the
writing of denunciations and by aiding in the Terror, then repentance is not needed and the Gulag
can remain a distance threat rather than one’s home and personal hell.
Aftermath: “Silence is the real crime against humanity”116
The Terror ended in early 1938. In a letter titled “On the Final Victory of Socialism in the
U.S.S.R” to the staff propagandist of the Manturovsk District, Josef Stalin declares that they,
“succeeded in liquidating our bourgeoisie, in establishing fraternal collaboration with our
peasantry and in building.”117 With this, the Terror of the 1930s was over. However, despite the
end date of 1938, the effects of the Terror continued, with many people implicated, arrested, and
killed for supposed crimes without justification and without due process until 1953. The fear still
survived within the average citizen and millions were forced to readapt into the world after the
Terror.
Denunciations during the Terror were not only limited to supposed enemies and other
official targets, entangling many throughout the Soviet Union. The web even managed to
entangle those who had denounced previously. 118 Many who denounced were later denounced
themselves, even with most of those who were denounced being innocent. Many played an active
role in continuing the oppressive regime that later turned on them and punished them like they
had before. Some were conflicted about this turn of events, wondering what they had done to
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deserve this treatment. However, others believed they were an error within the system, an error
which was justifiable for all of the ‘conspirators’ caught during the process. This belief also
relates to the teachings from the party on the importance of hardships in the process of obtaining
utopia.
This issue of justification was prominent in the later years of the Soviet Union.
Mandelstam writes, “Every new killing was excused on the grounds that we were building a
remarkable ‘new’ world in which there would be no more violence, and that no sacrifice was too
great for it. Nobody noticed that the end had begun to justify the means, and then, as always,
gradually been lost sight of.”119 No resistance or push back led many to see the actions of the
government as a necessary evil and some even justified the horrors they witnessed by calling
upon the promised utopia. With this, the aftermath of the Terror becomes focused on the gradual
amnesia that has plagued the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation today. Many have come
to see the Soviet Union as a high point and Stalin as the strong leader needed in a time of
discontent and disorder.
The Terror has never been ‘claimed’ in Russia. Few have admitted fault and even more
have passed the responsibility onto someone else. 120 Despite evidence to the contrary, the Party
denies their actions and the masterminds behind the plan either died without having to directly
accept their responsibility or were able to use the totalitarian regime to their benefit. This is true
even in modern-day Russia, where memories of the Terror are repressed and the lessons of the
1930s are lost to history. 121 For Gulag prisoners, “their survival is necessarily the cumulative
consequence of how their physical and mental abilities coped with and adapted to the
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repression.”122 But even their actions and behaviors were influenced by the attitudes of the nation
that has never shied away from changing history for its benefit, denying them the peace that
suffered for.
In 1953, many of those placed into the camps under Stalin were released. A commission
was sent in the early months of Khrushchev’s tenure to the camps to investigate the penal
system.123 Many believed the CPSU would acknowledge the atrocities committed, but instead
offered forgiveness to victims for crimes they were only accused of. Some were offered
rehabilitation, but for many, rehabilitation and reinstatement would be life-long processes,
sometimes only completed after the fall of Communism in 1991. Along with this, many petitions
for reinstatement and rehabilitation focused on proving innocence through the denunciation of
others, only continuing this cycle.
There is a lot of difficulty in attempting to understand the mindset of the Terror from
memoirs, as memoirs are few and far in between. The average citizen was quick to repress their
feelings and memories on the Terror while those affected by the Gulags number in the
millions.124 Those who wrote memoirs were usually highly-educated, prominent members of
society before the Terror, and some were ardent followers of communism. However, with the
number of letters calling for rehabilitation, a restoration of once-deprived rights, and
reinstatement within the Party, some judgement on the victims’ mindset can be made. After
Stalin’s death, many applied for rehabilitation, and many were able to receive this status. 125 The
question becomes how can people victimized by their government, the very government
responsible for their imprisonment, remain loyal to the party and ask for rehabilitation?
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For others, rehabilitation was not enough. They petitioned for reinstatement into the Party
ranks, a bestowed position not automatically regained upon rehabilitation. For many, this process
was about gaining or regaining the benefits membership gave. With reinstatement, time spent in
the camps and fighting for reinstatement were added to one’s tenure within the Party. 126
Membership, especially long-term, “offered instrumental social advantages for housing, job
placement and professional advancement.” 127 Those who applied for reinstatement hoped
professing loyalty and acting within line would promise a normal live after the Gulag, something
desperately needed. Rehabilitation and reinstatement were not uniform and victim’s willingness
to reengage with their oppressors has been seen as a testament to the strength of the Communist
Party.128
The petitioning to be reinstated into the party and to be rehabilitated into society was
especially common in the countryside where dekulakization had many deprived of their rights. 129
In this process, many proclaimed their innocence through letters written to the CPSU where they
portrayed themselves as victims of exploitation, the same thing they were accused of. “Petition
writers also described how they, illiterate and incapable, were unable to ‘set themselves up’
under the new order.”130 Their denunciations called upon the policies and language established
by the CPSU and established themselves as the party’s ideal and their victim as the true enemy.
The CPSU was successful in the countryside through the use of already-present
prejudices, only exacerbated by the campaigns towards dekulakization and collectivization
where many were suddenly targeted. Golfo Alexopoulos argues that in these letters, denunciation
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was not required but was a regular occurrence. He questions whether this strategy was an attempt
for one to define their social identity in the polarized world of the Soviet Union. 131 As a result,
victim talk, when one tries to portray oneself as the victim, was a common feature of society on
all levels, including within the Soviet leadership about their so-called enemies.132 By using the
rhetoric put forth by the party, citizens were able to make themselves into the ideal Soviet
person, including being victims of exploitation and struggle during the petition and reinstatement
process. They reinvented themselves and carved their own part within this system, showing how
easy it is for someone who was a victim to turn the page and victimize those around them. In
doing so, “the disenfranchised helped to perpetuate the policy that condemned them.” 133
Dynamics were similar within the city but focused on the life within the factories. By
using factory newspapers, Wendy Goldman was able to show the fear and desperation necessary
to bring someone to denounce another. 134 She also touches upon the perpetuating cycle of
denunciations. One denunciation has a domino effect, affecting everyone that knows the
denounced but also aggravating the fear and suspicion many felt towards their friends and
families. “‘True believers,’ eager at first to aid the Party in its hunt for internal enemies, wrestled
with growing doubts at coworkers, bosses, parents, siblings, friends, and neighbors disappeared
into prisons.”135 The action of denouncing was not only limited to letters to the government, but
also those who wrote defamatory articles within the factory and those who pressured managers to
expel enemies. In this mostly closed-system, relationships were strained and many were accused
of wrecking, especially during public meetings.
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In the beginning, some trusted the NKVD to investigate their claims and restore
justice.136 However, as the Terror only grew worse, this trust of the secret police was eroded and
many became aware of their vulnerability and impurity. An inkling of doubt about the Party and
its actions and its victims caused some to rethink what the government was considering an
enemy. When any personal connection to the denounced or imperfection within one’s biography
can be used against them, hopelessness sets in. Some feel compelled to follow the Party’s will in
the hopes of protecting themselves and others become resigned to their fates, but in the end, the
Terror scars everyone it touches and is felt for decades after its official end.
The period of the Terror was marked by changes in how the average citizen viewed the
Party. Some were convinced that Stalin was responsible, so with the next general secretary,
problems would be solved. However, with the beginning of Nikita Khrushchev’s regime in 1953,
hopes were dashed when the man who denounced Stalin’s crimes continued to exercise the
centralization of control within the empire. 137As a result, the reprieve from Terror did not last
long and the mindset of persecution, fear, and forced loyalty only continued.
This loyalty was not widespread. Many remained distrustful or resentful of the CPSU
until they died and it is difficult to imagine what the thoughts of the millions who died within the
labor camps would be.138 Many saw themselves as an expendable slave labor within the larger
issues of industrialization and modernization of small villages and parts of Siberia. This is
contrasted with those who did not lose faith in the mission of the CPSU, even if they lost faith in
Stalin as a leader. Some advocated for lost parents or spouses just for a sake of justice. 139 In the
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end, “tens of thousands were to apply for and receive rehabilitation,” and while this did nothing
to undo the injustice, for some it was enough. 140
So back to the question of why loyalty persisted within some individuals. On this topic,
Nanci Adler, in her interviews with workers from that era, noted many were proud of the work
they did in modernizing and building cities, some of which helped in the war effort. 141 They
became the foundation of socialism in these parts and, if they chose to remain in these isolated
towns, were exalted for their efforts. While they might not agree with the methods that the CPSU
took, they still believed in the end goal: class-less utopia. They saw their imprisonment as
supporting the ideology in its mission, a noble perspective to take on such a harrowing
experience. Adler also proposes that, once again, the Party has taken up a religious aspect: “If the
Gulag experience is perceived as brutalized forced labour, it is repression. If it is perceived as a
‘labour of love,’ if veers in the direction of devotion. The redeeming value of religious suffering,
even martyrdom, comes to mind.”142
For many, the effects of the Terror still reign. Private life was obliterated, personal
relationships were strained or ruined, fear was still a daily reminder of the past, and the belief in
utopia never came. Wendy Goldman called a consequence of the Terror “dual-mindedness,”
where one was forced to split public loyalty and private discontent. 143 This dealt with the issues
of coming to terms with denouncing others while trying to protect family and friends, agreeing
with the Party in actions but not in thought, feigning security in the face of vulnerability. What
someone said in public was not necessarily what they believed, creating a disconnect in some
people, aggravated by the continuation of fear, even after 1938.
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Over five million victims returned to Soviet society, a number which does not include
exiles and deportees. These numbers are also complicated by the 1937 census. The data for the
1937 census was repressed when the extent of the 1932-1933 Famine and the Terror was
shown.144“In 1936, the official estimate of the total USSR population at the beginning of 1933
(based on the 1926 census and ZAGS data about births, emigration and deaths) was 165.7
million. The 1937 census figure, however, was only 162 million.” 145 This was a problem for the
Soviet Union who intended to use this data for propagandistic purposes. While the real number
of victims will never be known for certain, the census taken at the height of the Terror provides
some insight into the destruction of the 1930s.
The CPSU had to toe a precarious line between the indoctrination and terror. When
indoctrination failed, terror becomes the only option. “It is the party and the ideology together
that provide the system with its inbuilt momentum. The decline of either would force the regime
to rely almost exclusively on terror, as Stalin did, or face the prospect of far-reaching
transformation of the system.”146 With the onset of the Terror in 1934, the strains of Stalin’s
totalitarian regime were beginning to show. However, some have pondered whether this reign of
terror is just another stage within the system of trying to create a new order within the Soviet
Union, including modernizing a traditional and, overall, uneducated society into a global
powerhouse.147 While this has been debated, it is clear that Stalin had a direct impact on the
actions of the thirties. Stalin, aware of the discontent that beginning to rise, used the Terror as a
social safety-valve, halting people’s thoughts and actions on acting against the government.
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However, with this method, the terror becomes cyclical, making many wonder if terror is the
only way to prevent tensions from spilling out while also contributing to this tension?
Conclusion
After Stalin’s death in 1953, 1.2 million Gulag prisoners were liberated. 148 However, this
does not account for the great numbers still within the camps or the problem of how the
government should deal with the aftermath of Stalinism and the subsequent Terror. The release
of the prisoners could be seen as a form of amnesty performed by the government without
directly condemning the actions of the Party. Prisoners were forgiven for crimes they had not
committed, for allegations that were unfounded, for being part of something bigger than
themselves involuntarily, without the promise of rehabilitation. 149 This continues the
victimization of Gulag prisoners while absolving the Party of any transgressions and mistakes.
With Stalin’s death, for many, the Terror was not over.
The Terror and its widespread effects are shown in the pervasive fear still felt within the
Russian Federation. The government still has a strong hold on the citizenry within Russia,
continuing the cycle proposed by Brzezinski of terror being a necessary part in consolidating
power. Whether something like the Terror will happen again in modern-day Russia has yet to be
seen, but the beginnings are there, in official government policy, in fear-mongering, and in
censorship and propaganda. However, this paper has shown that while the government is
responsible for fostering this environment, it is those who willing denounced others, exploit this
fear, and call for punishment that are responsible. It is easy, with pressure coming from all sides
to conform to ideals that challenge one’s morality, to go against social norms, and become
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involved in something bigger than one can imagine, but it is not impossible to resist, even
silently.
It is this willingness to conform in the face of fear that makes the Terror and
denunciations overall so important. It was seen during: the Salem Witch Trials, where people
were executed for just an accusation of witchcraft; McCarthyism, where members of the public
were blacklisted for even suspected sympathies to the Communists; and is still seen today in the
era of social media, doxing, and people and companies being “cancelled” for anything, including
misunderstandings. While the court of public opinion is not as forceful and punishing as a
government effort, the court of public opinion still has a major influence on one’s daily life, and
if one finds themselves on the wrong side of this line, it is very difficult to overcome and return
to society untainted. Denunciation exists in cultures all over the world and has only become
easier to issue with the access to the Internet and easier to enforce through the rapid spread of
information. However, most would not see their actions as denunciation, which makes it all the
more terrifying.
While another example like the Terror will, hopefully, never happen on this scale again,
the issue of denunciation and its effects are important as technology makes communication and
spreading of information quicker and easier. This argument is significant because it shows how
easily a society can devolve into fear and how quickly denunciations can spread and wreak
havoc. From learning from the Soviet example, one can see the beginnings and combat
misinformation, propaganda, and fear. However, it is difficult to pin down why people denounce,
and, as stated previously, there are many reasons, including patriotism and self-interest. This
makes the act of denouncing difficult to fully understand and prevent. Without learning about
this shameful moment of history, one cannot hope to prevent another Terror from taking place.
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